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BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
STATEMENTOFNATUREOFCASE 
This matter comes before the court on appeal from 
the decision of the State Tax Commission of Utah. The 
question presented is whether or not stepchildren in loco 
zian0;11tis to a decedent qualify as "children" of that 
de('odent under the provisions of Section 59-12-2, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE 
STATE TAX COMMISSION 
After consideration of all pertinent facts and the 
la\Y, the State Tax Commission on April 27, 1966, ren-
1 
dered a decision disallowing 1 he $40,000 cxrrnption lliii[ 
denying the refund sought by th(_• iictitio11cr Wnlliii 
Bank and Trust Company, cxceutor of 1 lie cRtatc of 1f1.1_ 
bert E. Sargent, arnl plaintiff in thiR ad ion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the decision of Ap1;1 
27, 1966, above referred to, and in particular a rPfonrl 
of $1,200.00 paid to the State as inheritance taxPs at ilii 
earlier point in this proceeding. (Rrcord 24-28) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties to this action have entered into D Stij111-
lation of Facts (R. 64-66). These are restated in c;llh-
stance in the Commission's formal decision (R. 61-6~1), 
and set forth ·with substantial accuracy in the brief of 
plaintiff, Walker Bank and Trnst Company. 
One additional fact not fournl in any of these docu-
ments should be noted. The surviving stepchildren, Ed-
ward R., William Y., and Richard L. Bywater, had at-
tained adulthood and left the home of Herbert E. Sarge11L 
many years before his death. 
ARGU.MENT 
POINT I 
rrHE TERM "CHILDREN" IN SECTION 
50-12-2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, rs 
NOri.1 AMBIGUOUS AND MAY NOT PROP-
F~RLY BE CONsrrRUED TO EXTEND THE 
$40,000 l'~XK\fprrION BENEFirr TO STEP-
CHILDREN OR OTHERS IN LOCO PAREN-
TIS TO A Dl'~CEDENT. 
SN·tio11 39-12-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, sets 
fortli 111e rates of taxation arnl exemption of estates of 
rnrious sizes, and providrs in part as fo11ows: 
A tax equal to the sum of the following percent-
ages of the market value of the net estate shall 
lie' imposed upon the transfer of the net estate of 
evcr.Y dcecdent, whether a resident or nonresident 
of this state: 
'l1luce per cent of the amount by which the net es-
tate exceeds $10,000 nnd not to exceed $25,000, ex-
cept ·where propert~- not exeeeding in value the 
sum of $40,000 goes to the husband, ·wife and/or 
children of the deceased or any or all of them by 
descent, de,-ise, bequest or transfer directly or 
th rough a trustee, then in such case the exemptions 
shall be the amount so going not to exceed $40,000. 
'flrns, an exemption is created in the amount of 
$10,000 for any estate, but if property is left to the hus-
band, wife and/or children of the deceased, the exemp-
tion ean he as great as $40,000. 
Plaintiff asserts in Point I of his brief that there is 
rlonht as to the legislative intent in the use of the term 
3 
"children" in this prov1s10n, and therefore, the tt>rrn 
''children'' should be applied to include stepchildren iu 
loco parentis as well as natural children. Without at. 
tempting to pass on the soundness of this lO'gical garnhit, 
we would suggest that the premise on which it is bal'ed, 
that an ambiguity exists in the statute requiring extra. 
legislative interpretive aid, is clearly erroneous. 
Plaintiff cites some cases in support of this conten-
tion ( p. 5), none of which deal with construction of the 
term "children," all rather supporting generally the 
proposition that ambiguities in statutes imposing taxa-
tion should be construed in favor of those bearing the 
burden of the tax (which proposition will be subsequently 
examined). 
The word "children" is a term of precision and has 
a definite meaning in legal as well as general usage. De-
spite counsel's assertion that there are no decisions of 
this honorable court interpreting this term in the con-
text of Section 59-12-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, tl1e 
case of In Re Walton's Estate, 115 Utah 160, 203 P. 2d 293 
(1949), involved this precise problem. The court rather 
summarily rejected the claim of the executrix of the Wal-
ton estate, Elizabeth M. Jerrell, that grandchildren arc 
entitled to the larger exemption. Chief Justice Pratt, 
writing for the majority of the court, spoke of the com-
monly accepted meaning of the term ''children'' as being 
sons and daughters and said that if the term "children" 
is to be used in any other sense, or extended in its mean-
ing, such use must be as a result of specific legislative 
directive. He examined the section above quoted am! 
4 
relai cJ provisions, and condrnled that the term is therein 
11 srcl in its common meaning. Justice Wolfe, in a con-
(•nrring opinion, agreed that the word should be given its 
"plain and literal meaning." 
1'he comments of these justices bring to mind the 
"plain meaning" rule of statutory construction, which 
is that when a statute is plain on its face and without am-
liiguiiv it meam, what it says, and ambiguities should not 
hr created hy tortured and unnatural construction based 
npon remote hypotheticals. Generally, words of the stat-
ute are to be construed in the ordinary sense and mean-
ing given them and commonly attributable to them. In 
Re Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 17, 269 Pac. 103 (1927). 
·we thus submit that the meaning of the word "chil-
tlren'' in this statute, and other statutes of this type, is 
clear. In this type of legislation the term "children" 
may include adopted as well as natural children, and il-
legitimate as well as legitimate children, depending upon 
the particular jurisdiction, but does not extend beyond 
these relationships. This can be emphasized by reference 
to Appendix A of phintiff's brief. Where-ver state legis-
laturrs have determined that stepchildren should be in-
rl11rfrrl in the same classification as natural or adopted 
cliildrrm, for inheritance ta«- p11rposes, they have specifi-
cally so prm,ided by inclusion in the statute describing 
that rlassification, the word "stepchildren" or a;nother 
word or phrase of similar import. Counsel has cited no 
case in which a state not hal'ing such specific statutory 
7no 1'ision has construed the term" children" in these ta<r-
statutes to include stepchildren or others not children 
5 
ioho are in loco parcntis rclatio11sliips. 'l.'hc langnagr· 
chosen in these statutes, and the net result of the appli-
cation of such language, vary according to legislatire 
intent. 
Abundant case authority supports the propol:liti 011 
above set forth. For example, in Houston v. Mc:Ki1111cy, 
54 Fla. 600, 45 So. 480 (1907), the eourt sai(l in disrussin;; 
a statute involving descent and distribution that "tl1P pri-
mary sense of children is offspring and that is tlw sen~1' 
of relationship in whieh it is ordinarily used \Ylic11 tht) 
question of relationship is i1ffolnd .... It cannot be prop-
erly held when found in a statute or contra.et to include 
stepchildren.'' To the same effect are Snydor v. Palmer, 
29 \,Vis. 226 (1871), Bla11kenbaker v. Suyder, 18 Ky. L:rn 
Rep. 4:17, 36 S.\V. 1124 (1896), 'Pepper v. Supreme Co1111-
cil of Royal Arcanum, 59 N. ,J. Eq. 321, 45 Atl. 111 (18!J!l), 
and In Re O'Co11~wrs 1Vill, 140 :Mise. 757, 251 N. Y. S. 
686 (1931). 
Plaintiff plaees great re lianee upon the assertion t liat 
taxing statutes should he eonstrued i11 fa,·or d the tax-
payer. The Tax Commission has no quanel with tli:· 
the proposition that where a statute is ambig·uons as t 11 
whether or not a particular tax should })e imposr:l, snd1 
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the taxpa~-c·r: 
however, one of the primary principles of revenue stat-
ute interpretation is that provisions sPtting forth exemp-
tion from taxes of general imposition must be construed 
against the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing po1cPr. 
Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679, 24 L. Ed. 558, :rno 
(1878), Judge v. Spencer, 15 Utah 242, 48 Pae. 1097, 
6 
I IH~ll); Still'/11011 \'. Lyn<'h, 56 Utah 540, 192 Pac. 272; 
12 1\. L. B. :'ifJ2, ( 1920). 
As a general rule, grants of tax exemptions are 
ginn a rigid interpretation against the assertions 
of the taxpayer arnl in favor of the taxing power. 
The basis for the rule here is the same as that 
supporting a rule of strict construction of posi-
tin revenue laws - that the burden of taxation 
should be distributed equally and fairly among the 
members of society. Sutherland, Statutory Con-
strnction, 3cl ed., se<:>. 6702. See also Cooley, Taxa-
tion, 4th ed., sec. 672. 
Tt is clenr tlrnt the problem of exemption and not the 
prolllPm of imposition is here involved, since the question 
lwfore the court is not whether or not the tax is appro-
1wiate, hut simply whether plai11tiff is entitled to a larger 
or smnller exemption. 
Ex(•mption, like taxation, is a matter of legislative 
priYilege and grace, and "not properly to be claimed 
beyond the extent to ·which the law-making body has seen 
fit to allow it." 85 C.J.S. Taxation, sec. 1157. See also In 
Rr Foss' Estatr, 114 Wash. 681, 196 Pac. 10 (1921); Peck 
Y. State, 96 Cal. App. 2d 638, 216 Pac. 2d 132 (1950). 
As stated in rorpus Juris SPcundum: 
Generally, statutory exemptions from inheritance 
or similar taxes should be strictly construed 
against the claimant thereof, and held applicable 
onl~T to subject matter or beneficiaries clearly 
within their terms. 85 C.J.S. Taxation, sec. 1157. 
A statutory exemption of a transfer to a person 
or persons bearing a certain relationship to de-
7 
cedent, such as that of \vife or hushalld, and a 
statutory exemption of a transfer to a pcrso11 01. 
persons bearing a relationship to the decrdent 
such as that of ch.ild ... ?'PP~ies when, and rml!J 
uihcn, the person in question is of the designated 
relationship . ... (Emphasis supplied.) 85 C .. J.S. 
Taxation, sec. 1163. 
The thesis last set forth is applicable in this juri.~ 
diction, since our Supreme Court has held that the literal 
terms of our inheritance tax statutes cannot be extended 
by constru0tion. In Re Thompson's Estate, supra. 
Thus, if the court should see ambiguities in Scrt1on 
59-12-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, of significance in 
the instant case, it is by no means clear that tlwse need 
be resolved in the manner most favorable to plaintiff. We 
\\'Ould strongly suggest, however, that such ambiguities 
are not present, that the statute is clear and comprehensi-
ble, and that the court need not resort to any rules of 
interpretation beyond the plain meaning rule to <leier-
mine the legislative intent behind Section 59-12-2. 
"Where the language of the statute is clear, rule:,; of 
construction applicable in case of doubt do not apply." 
85 C.J.S. Taxation, sec. 1135. See also Tacenor "· J'aJ' 
Commission of Iowa, 231 Iowa 362, 300 N.\V. 653 (1941). 
POINT II 
AS A RESULT OF THE HISTORICAL EVO-
LUTION OF INHERITANCE AND SUCCES-
SION LAW, FROM WHICH INHERITANCE 
TAX LAW IS IN LARGE PART DERIVA-
TIVE MEANINGFUL DISTINCTIONS EXIST 
QUITE UNIVERSALLY BETWEEN CHIL-
8 
DRl~N AND PERSONS NOT CHILDREN IN 
LOCO PARENTIS IN THIS AREA EXCEPT 
IN .JURISDICTIONS WHERE SUCH DIS-
'l'IN('.TIONS ARE SPFJCIFICALLY ABRO-
GA'I'ED BY STATUTE. UTAH IS NOT SUCH 
A .JURISDICTION. 
Tn the medieval period, the distinctions between an 
act na l chilcl and another person in the household not a 
cliilrl were extremely significant, particularly in relation 
to surh institutions as investiture and primogeniture, as 
c•Yerr reader of medieval history and particularly me-
diernl literature is aware. These distinctions have con-
tinued as this law has evolved and are almost universally 
present today in the law of inheritance except where 
modifie(l hy statute, and these principles have carried 
onr into inheritance tax la,Y, which is in large part 
derinltiw from the law of inheritance. The general rule 
is 11ere stated: 
'' ... A stepchild is not ordinarily entitled to in-
hrrit from its stepfather or stepmother, as the 
case may be; but he is so entitled if the case is 
·within the terms of the statute conferring the 
right of inheritance upon him in a prescribed sit-
uation.'' 26A C . .J.C. Descent and Distribution, 
sec. 34. 
The research in plaintiff's brief supports this propo-
sition, and in doing so negates the argument plaintiff 
advances. The appendices show that certain jurisdic-
tions have by statute extended family inheritance tax 
exemptions to include stepchildren. In such jurisdic-
tirllls, the stepchild is entitled to the same advantages as 
the remainder of the class of which he is made a part by 
9 
legislative decree. In the states wht>re the legislahu·p 
has not seen fit to make such an extension, a stppchild doc, 
not receive the same benefits as a natural or (in mri.<;t 
cases) an adopted child. It should again be notc'd tlinl 
there is no case cited in plaintiff's brief from a jurj8_ 
diction without the broader statutory language wher0in a 
stepchild has been gra11ted an inheritanc0 tax 0xemptio11 
existing for ''children.'' 
Plaintiff is, in fact, asking this court to substitute 
itself for the legislature of this state ancl to extern1 our 
law beyond its obvious intent, on the theory that 1<•gi8lil-
tures in many other states have seen fit to do so and 
therefore it must be a good idea. 
A number of cases cited in Point I illustrate thr 
distinction historically drawn between a child, and one 
not a child in loco parentis, in an inheritance or inlwri-
tance tax frame of reference. To the same effect, aml 
particularly telling, is In Re Kurtz's Estate, 145 Pa. 631, 
23 AtL 322 (1892). Here, the decedent left spe('ific 
legacies to natural children, and to stepchildren whom 
he designafod in his will as ''children.'' His will also in-
cluded a residue clause leaving the remainder of his es-
tate after distribution of the specific grants fo his ""'ife 
and children." His stepchildren were excluded fro111 this 
residual distribution. 
Also of interest is Fulton Trust Cornpany Y. Trn1r-
bridge, 126 Conn. 369, 11 A. 2d 383, 127 A.L.R. /J 
(1940). Gardiner Trowbridge brought a child into hi,, 
home in 1926, and "became very much attached to him" 
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and reforn~cl to him and treated him in every respect 
as his sou. In 1929, he made a will, making provision 
for this ehild. In 1930, he formally adopted the child. 
The court held that this adoption revoked the 1929 will 
on assumption of a parental relationship, which under 
Com1ecticut law revokes wills previously drawn. To the 
same effeet is In Re Guilmartin, 250 App. Div. 762, 293 
N.Y. Supp. 665, (1937). Contra, Bowdlear v. Bowdlear, 
1J2 ::\lass. 184 (1873). 
The court's attention is particularly directed to the 
case of Olson v. United States, 175 F. 2d 510 (1949). 
H Pre Grace Olson raised a hoy ''as her own child'' until 
the child was killed in an airplane crash. The court, in-
terpreting Utah law, denied the mother the right to sue as 
tlie heir of such child, because she failed to meet her 
"lrnrd011" "affirmatively to prove the fact of adoption." 
In Point III of his brief, counsel for plaintiff enu-
merates a number of cases in various fields of law in 
which stepchildren, foster children, etr., have for cer-
tain purposes been treated as if they were natural chil-
dren. In our pluralistic and increasingly complex civili-
zation it is inevitable that a number of such cases should 
nrisP, and in their particular factual contexts many of 
them undoubtedly do reach desirable results. By no 
mPans, however, do they represent a pattern. There are 
a comparable number of eases where existing laws, cou-
pled with pragmatic considerations of fact and equity, 
ha Ye lecl to contrary holdings. For instance, in Smith v. 
,1tla11fic Coast Railroad Company, 212 S. C. 332, 47 S.E. 
2d 72:> (1948), Odessa Jackson had treated Nelson But-
11 
ler in all r0spects as her actual child si11ce bringing ]1 
into her househo1(1 wh0n nine m011ths old, en•11 thou,2;11 f 
failed to formrrll>- adopt him. Butler instituted an act 
for her wrongful death under a statut0 a11thorizi11~ 
"child" to bring such a claim. Tho court rull~d that 
was not a child of the deceasetl and thNefore with1 
standing to hring such an action. 
The really si.~nifieant thing about the cnsrs C'itr(l 
Point III of plaintiff's brief is that no11e of them rel 
even remotely to inheritance taxes; they starnl asi(le t 
apart from the e\'Olution which has resnltecl in tl1e e 
trolling legal concepts in this area. They deal ,,-ith . 
verse possession, liability for medical s0rvie0s, real est 
transactions, seduction, interest pa~-ments, gratuit( 
servie0s, automobile injuries - just about everything 
cept descent and distribution and the tax consequen 
of the same. This is the area of law with which we arr h 
conc0rned, and in this area a clear distinction lwtw( 
children, aml unadopted stepchildren or others in 7, 
parentis, exists, and we rospectfnll~, suggest that in t 
jurisdiction on]~- natural or adopted children are 
titled to the hi~her exemption rate. 
POINT III 
AN }, DOPTION OF THE POSITION URG: 
BY PLA.INTIFF WOULD RESULT IN P: 
MINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS AND INVI' 
INEQUITIES NOT PRESENT IN CURRE 
PRACTICE. 
In Point V of his brief plaintiff argues that the Cc 
mission could administer the statutory exemption " 
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ease if it were extended to include others than natural 
or adopted children. While the relevance of this type of 
a:-;sertion is not completely apparent, since the Commis-
sion has the responsibility to administer laws given it by 
the Legislature to the best of its ability, and it is pri-
marily the prerogative of the latter body to worry about 
whether or not a particular law might lend itself to ease 
of administration, it is clear that an acceptance of plain-
titf 's position would in fact bring great administrative 
difficulties, the number and variety of which can only he 
estimated at this time. 
The term" in loco parentis," in spite of its imposing 
Lati11 phraseology, is not a precise legal term or in any 
sense a term of art, but simply a phrase describing a gen-
eral supervisory-responsibility relationship existing tem-
porarily or permanently between two people, one of whom 
will usually be considerably older than the other. ·when 
plaintiff states that the phrase has "a fairly definite 
meaning,'' he makes the stongest possible case. 
To use this test as determinative as to whether or 
not a person should be entitled to the higher exemption 
provided for in Section 59-12-2, Utah Code Annotated, 
l 053, would bring a number of dimensions and consid-
erations into the administration of this law that have 
heretofore been fortunately absent. For example, what 
if a boy li\'ed in five foster homes during his childhood? 
1f each of the foster parents left property to him, would 
earh estate be entitled to the full $40,000 exemption 7 If 
uot, would each be entitled to 20% of the exemption; 
ancl if the latter, would this be 20% of the full $40,000 
or 20% of the $30,000, separating the lower and higher 
13 
exemptio11; (There are 110 proration proh1ems in the 1n\\ 
as current I:- atlrninistered.) Awl vvhat if tlw chil<l liwd 
(as he urnlonhtedly would have) different p0rio<ls of timr 
in the various homes? If he livecl 37.4% of his chil<lhoorl 
in one home, would a 37.4% 0xemvtion apply? And wlrni 
if the child mmried and left home late, say at ~7 or 28, 
would this he the end of the pt•riocl of math<>matir;1I 
computations involved, or ·would it he the attainm011t of 
majority at 21? Conversely, what if the child married 
at 17? 
Perhn11s it might be urged that the exemption :-:ho11l1l 
only apply if the child were living i11 the home in /ou1 
pa.rentis at the time of the death of the dece<lent. In thi, 
case, if a child liYed 18 years in one foster home, moHd 
into a second home, and had both foster fathers die with 
in a few da,\'S after the move, would not a gross im·11uity 
be done by a11m'l'ing the second estate the full rxempti011 ~ 
Incidentall:-, if this type of requirement were adoptr1l, 
the instant prolilem would result in a denial of any con-
sideration since thr Bywater children had long sinl'e 
moved out of the Sargent home. 
Suppose :notlwr possihilit:- - n ehilcl living in one 
home, but l;ein~ supported for the most part by another 
adult. In thiR case a ·whole new series of possihilitie~ 
arise to challenge the imagination. 
Another hypothetieal presents yet another series of 
potential problems. vVhat if a child were temporarily, 
say a month every year, in a loco parentis situation with a 
relative or other supervising adult. Three months a 
yead Eight months~ 
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,\ n c~xtension of the law to include stepchildren would 
111' a liitl0 easier to handle, since this term is somewhat 
kc~:-; \'ague, hut again interpretive and especially equi-
i;il ilC' iirohlems present themselves. Jm;t to cite one ex-
ample, suppose John Jones married the widow Smith 
( 11 lio lias a fiftc>en-year-old daughter) on October 8, 
]%(). Suppose further that John Jones died October 
D, 1 %G. ·would equity and the pnhlie interest be served 
hy gi\·ing the daughter a full exemption should Mr. Jones 
liHPill'll to lm,·e written a will making her a beneficiary 
prior to or on the day of his marriage? Another problem 
Hl'l'll would be that of former stepchildren. vVhat if di-
\'()}"('(' t0rmi11ated a stepfather-stepchild relationship of 
1ollg starnling '? \Vonld the exemption he present er 
wunlcl it ha\'e been terminated with the divorce? 
ff tlw exemption were ext0ndec1 to ineludf' plaintiff's 
pn'cise situation, a stepchild in loco porentis, the admin-
istratin~ prohlems involved in both of these concepts 
wonlcl he <'nmulatively present. 
Counsel for plaintiff repeatedly stresses that love, 
nffeetion, trust, respect, etc., often exist in these relation-
ships. vVonld it he suggested that the Commission should 
;11t<'mpt to measure or e\·aluate these intangible and 
snhjcdive emotions in resolving the difficult borderline 
('<1Sf'S that \\·onld of necessity arise under any regulatory 
1-;elwrne? 
'\Ve would suggest that an adoption of petitioner's 
position, or any part thereof, would not result in a con-
ti11uation of the administrative ease with which the stat-
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ute is no-w ha11clled, but rather in administrative clHlON. 
We would respectfully petition the court to keep the lid 
firmly closed on this Pandora's box. 
POINT IV 
AFFIR~IANCE OF THE TAX COMMISSION 
DECISION WOULD INSURE IN MOST CAs1~;s 
THAT THE WISH OF THE TESTATOH IS 
HONORED, AND WOULD ENCOURAGE 
ADOPTION. 
Plaintiff argues in Point IV of his brief that a11 ai'-
firmance of the Tax Commission's decision would frus-
trate the statutory policy of encouraging testators to 
leave estates to members of their immediate family. It 
is submitted that the Tax Commission's decision "·ould 
have exactly the opposite effect. 
Great emphasis is placed in plaintiff's brief on the 
love, affection and sentiment, and mutual need that can 
exist between stepchildren and step-parents and hc-
tween adults and other minors in their home who arc 
not children of such parents. It is further suggested 
that the step-parent, foster parent, etc., would in such a 
situation of ne'.'essity have the same motives and desires 
in relation to dic;position of their property to the step-
children or other minor as would a natural parent to hi~ 
child. vVhile this may or may not be true in any giw11 
situation, and while it is obviously impossible in this 
situation, in spite of all the affidavits and arguments 
offered by com1Sel for plaintiff, to determine ·whether or 
not Mr. Sargent had that type of affection and sentiments 
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toward the Bywater children, since Mr. Sargent, the only 
l!l'rson who would really be competent to testify to the 
pn~sc•uce or absence of such subjective emotions and mo-
tin•R, is deceased, ·we point out to the court that the law 
bas established a prucedure by which a step-parent or 
other adult in this type of situation can make certain that 
the stepchild or other minor receive exactly the same 
lJl•nefits and consideration at the time his estate is dis-
tributPd as a natural child. This procedure is adoption. 
Examination of the record can leave little doubt that 
:i1 r. Sargent had ample opportunity over a large number 
of yearR to adopt these children and assure that they 
would be treated in all respects as his natural children, 
including in respeet to inheritanee and inheritance taxes. 
SincE' it is presumed that every man knows the law, 
it may be argued that Mr. Sargent knew of the inheri-
tance and inheritance tax consequences of both adoption 
and non-adoption and chose the latter. Certainly it is in-
eonsistent with the record for plaintiff to suggest that 
~Ir. Sargent, because of his purported love and affection 
for the Bywater boys, would have been very anxious for 
them to have the same tax benefits as natural children, 
when it was solely within his power for many years to 
make certain that such benefits would be attained by 
them, and he failed to take the necessary steps to insure 
that sueh would be the case. If any legal inference can 
be dra,vn from his failure to adopt, it is certainly not an 
infernnce that he wished these stepchildren to be treated 
in all respeets as if they had been adopted. 
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Undc>r Utah law as 1ww admiuisten~d, it is thus oftp 11 
the testator who determines in this type of ea1w wlwiltf·r 
or not tlw In rp;cr exemption ma~- he allowed. 
Title 78, Chapter 30, Utah C'o<l<' Am10tated, rn:!:l, 
contains the adoption lmvs in this j urisdietion. Seei ion 
10 proYicl<'S : 
A ehilcl when adopted may take the' family name 
of the person adopti11g. After adovtio11 the tnn 
shall s11stain the legal rrlation of parent and rhild, 
and hare all the rights and be s11bjPtt to a/1 t71r: 
duties of that relationship. (Emphasis snpplir1l) 
It seems axiomatic that if thruugh adopti011 hn1 
people atbin the relationship of pare11t and cl1ihl, \ritlt 
all attendant rig·hts and obligations, that before ado)l-
tion such relationship did not exist. As has preyionslY 
been pointed out, an abundance of case authorit~- sup-
ports this proposition. 
Some states make certain (1isti11ctiorn; l!ctwee11 adopt 
ed and natural children; for instance, in this jurisdiction 
an adopted child i.s not '' issne. '' L1 my Y. A my, 12 LT tali 
278, 42 Pac. 1121 (1895), aff'd, 171 U. S. 179, 43 L. Ed. 
127, 18 Sup. Ct. 802, In Re Harrington's Estate, 96 TTtnh 
252, 85 P. 2d 6:10, 128 A.L.R. 130 ( 19:18). In most juris<lir-
tions, howe-«cr, adopted children are accorded the same 
rights in the prws of inheritance and inheritmwe tnx 
benefits as natural children, and the clear trend seems to 
be toward broader implementation of this laudatory 110!-
icy. See cases summarized in 105 A.L.R. 1176, 127 A.LR 
750 and, most recently, in 43 A.L.R. 2d 118. 
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rtaJi is d(~ar!y ('0Inlllitt0d to the proposition that, 
for irnrposes of inheritance taxation, adopted children 
a re to be treated exactly as natural children. See Sec-
tio11s 74-1-31, 74-1-32, 74-4-5 as amended, and 74-4-12, 
Ftnh (~ode Annotated, 1953. This makes it possible for 
ally testator who wishes to carry out his desire to have 
strpehihhen, foster children, etc., treated in all respects 
as his own chil<lren to do so. The Tax Commission has 
]ollg re<'ognized the identity of interests and rights of 
natural ancl adopted children as being in the best interests 
of t-<Ociety. An adherence to the policy urged by plaintiff 
would discourage adoption proceedings, and thereby dis-
ennrage family unity and solidarity, which are desirable 
public policy goals. 
The Commission has through the years consistently 
interpreted the relevant statutory provisions to not allo-w 
the higher exemption to apply to stepchildren, foster chil-
clrl'n, or others not natural or adopted children who are 
in loco parentis to decedents. It is submitted that this 
long-standing interpretation and practice is correct and 
should be considered in the court's deliberations, for 
"where contemporaneous and practical interpretation 
has stood unchallenged for a considerable length of time, 
it will be regarded as of great importance in arriving at 
tl10 proper construction of a statute.'' Sutherland, Sta tu-
tor>· Construction, 3cl ed., sec. 5107. 
The citizens and the Legislature of this State, and its 
Bar and Bench have for decades acquiesced without chal-
lenge in the Commission's interpretations and adminis-
tration of this law. This acquiescence is persuasive evi-
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dence of the correctness of the Commission's interpre-
tation. Couch v. Independent Brotherhood of Teamsters 
' 308 P. 2d 117 (Okla. 1956); State v. Yelle, 52 Wash. 2d 
158, 324 P. 2d 247 (1951); Shockley v. Abbott Supply Co., 
50 Del. 510, 135 A. 2d 607 (1957); Dixie Coaches v. Rams-
den, 238 Ala. 285, 190 So. 92 (1939); Murray Hospital Y. 
Angrove, 92 Mont. 101, 10 P. 2d 577 (1932). 
CONCLUSION 
Section 59-12-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, rstal1-
lishes a special exemption from inheritance tax imposi-
tion when properties are devised or hequeathed to the 
husband, wife, or children of the decedent. The tr rm 
"children" by its plain meaning is limited to natural or 
adopted children in this jurisdiction and this limiting in-
terpretation evolved from and is totally consistent with 
the body of Anglo-American law, particularly that part 
dealing with descent and succession. 
Some states have chosen to modify this common law 
approach by extending special inheritance tax exemption 
provisions to a larger class, sometimes including step-
children or others not natural or adopted children in locu 
parentis. In such jurisdictions a more liberal exemption 
is appropriate according to the statutory directive. In 
jurisdictions such as Utah, however, which have not hy 
statute extended the common law concept to permit step-
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children or others uot in loco parentis to the decedent to 
be tr<:> a ted as children for inheritance purposes, relief 
such as the executor is here seeking is not available. 
Our statute is clear but even if it were ambiguous, 
any doubt as to its meaning would have to be resolved 
against the taxpayer asserting exemption and in favor of 
the taxing authority. 
No inequity would be done by affirming the Com-
mission's decision, since the Legislature has provided a 
means - adoption - whereby persons can secure to a 
stepchild or another in loco parentis the same benefits 
that accrue to a natural child. Had the decedent, Herbert 
E. Sargent, adopted the Bywaters as he could have done, 
he could have provided for them the exemption they are 
now seeking. Since he had this power and he failed to 
exercise it, it is not consistent for the estate to argue -
for whatever such argument is worth - that he wanted 
these boys to be treated in all particulars as his natural 
children. 
A reversal of the Commission's decision in this mat-
ter would bring into what is at this time a very clean and 
equitable administration of a law uncertainty and some-
times even chaos. As compared to ''children,'' which is 
a clear and precise legal concept in this frame of ref er-
ence, requiring no strained interpretation, the phrase ''in 
loco parentis'' is vague indeed, since a child may be ''in 
loco parentis" to any number of adults during his life-
time. 
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In view of the above, and in reliance 011 existillg C«t~t· 
law, particularly the Walton case, it is respectfully s111i-
mitted that the decision of the Tax Commission was cor-
rect and equitable, and it is urged that this decisio11 br 
affirmed by this honorable court in its review at this time. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. IIANSFJN 
Attorney General 
1\1. REED HUNTJjjR 
Assistant A ttorncy General 
State Capitol Building 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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